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I. INTRODUCTION
{1} The Internet is a global "super-network of over 15,000 computer networks used by millions of
individuals, organizations, corporations and educational entities the world over."[1] As the Internet has
developed, it has become a medium not only for entertainment, but also an important source of information
and news distribution.[2] Because the Internet and the World Wide Web[3] have developed into important
resources for information and news, traditional media concerns and legal controversies have reached a level
of growing importance. While it is true that much of the "development of the law concerning the . . . Internet
[i]s in its infant stages,"[4] online defamation has received significant comment.[5]
{2} This paper will differ from the traditional means of analyzing Cyber-Libel,[6] by providing a unified
approach to the determination of rights and recoveries by the parties. It addresses the general and computer
law approaches, and provides a suggested Cyber-Libel approach to the issues of jurisdiction, choice of law,
and defamation law.[7] This survey is intended to provide a simple, coherent means to dealing with Cyber-
Libel, which if employed, would result in consistently fair results for both the plaintiff and defendant.
 
II. JURISDICTION
 
A. General Background
{3} Due process requires that a non-resident defendant stand trial in a particular court only if the court can
properly exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant.[8] In determining whether or not jurisdiction lies,
once contested by the defendant, it is the duty of the plaintiff to establish a "prima facie showing that
jurisdiction exists."[9] The allegations relating to the propriety of jurisdiction are presumed true to the extent
that they are not in conflict with the defendant's affidavits. Once the prima facie case is put forth by the
plaintiff, "all factual disputes [relating to the exercise of jurisdiction] are resolved in favor of the plaintiff."
[10]
{4} After the facts underlying the purported jurisdiction have been found, they must be applied to the
jurisdictional maxims of the state in which the court sits.[11] Many states have opted to extend jurisdiction to
the limits of due process; other states have chosen to particularly define the grant of jurisdiction. In either
scenario, the court must, after determining if jurisdiction exists under the state's jurisdiction statutes, inquire
whether or not the exercise of jurisdiction violates constitutional due process.[12] To satisfy the due process
requirement, the "assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant [must] be predicated on
'minimum contacts' between the defendant and the [forum] State."[13] In assessing the quality and nature of
contacts required for jurisdiction, the court determines if the exercise of personal jurisdiction is based upon
either general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction. In making this distinction, "[s]eparate tests have developed
to determine whether a forum has general or specific jurisdiction over a defendant."[14]
{5} General jurisdiction is the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant based upon his
contacts with the forum, which are unrelated to the cause of action plead by the plaintiff. It requires that the
defendant be engaged in "systematic and continuous" activities with the forum state.[15] The exercise of
general personal jurisdiction over a non-resident entity presents a difficult burden and is often rejected as a
basis for the exercise of jurisdiction by courts.[16]
{6} Specific jurisdiction lies where the contacts relied upon to establish the court's personal jurisdiction over
a defendant include the activity complained of by the plaintiff.[17] As at least one circuit has defined the test
for specific jurisdiction as requiring:
1) the nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction with the forum
or perform some act by which he purposely avails himself of conducting activities in the forum,
thereby invoking the benefits and protections [thereof];
2) the claim must be one which arises out of or results from the defendant['s] forum related
activities; and
3) [the] exercise of the jurisdiction must be reasonable.[18]
{7} This test essentially requires that the court find contacts, "such that maintenance of the suit does not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."[19] Often a court focuses on whether or not the
defendant, through his actions, could have anticipated being hailed into court in the forum state.[20] If the
court is able to make this finding, jurisdiction will likely be upheld.
{8} Determining personal jurisdiction in a Cyber-Libel case can be a difficult proposition. Unlike the
traditional forms of real-world tortious action, Cyber-Libel does not have a specific locus of bad act. The
potential anonymity of the tortfeasor, [21] and the potentially-wide distribution of the injury causing material
may make identification of proper jurisdiction unusually difficult. It is not unheard of for mere children to
have the capacity to inflict great damage technologically on a business or the government, with but a few
years of familiarity with computer use. If an individual needs such limited training to become a "hacker,"[22]
it is easy to see how others with even less experience can become a tortious threat on the Internet. With this
ability to hide true identity, and the wide-dispersing effect of the technology, jurisdictional issues can be
crucial. Thus, a clear and reliable treatment of this issue is crucial to consistency.
B. Some General Approaches To Online Personal Jurisdiction
1. Totality of Contacts Approach
{9} One approach taken by the courts to determine jurisdiction for actions based, at least in part on Internet
contacts, is a totality of contacts analysis. Using this method, the court considers the online contacts with the
forum and the more traditional forms of contact.[23] The court gathers and weighs all contacts that the
defendant has with the forum, either electronic or non-electronic, to determine whether sufficient minimal
contacts exist to assert specific jurisdiction.[24] In EDIAS Software International, L.L.C. v. Basis
International Ltd.,[25] the court found jurisdiction by looking to both Internet and non-Internet based
contacts. The court held that Basis purposely availed itself of the Arizona forum by posting defamatory
statements to its website and by e-mailing specific individuals in the Arizona forum these same defamatory
declarations. The court also, however, relied upon the facts that Basis entered into a contract with an Arizona
corporation, contacted EDIAS by telephone in Arizona, and sent facsimiles, invoices, products, and
employees to Arizona.[26] The court seemed to look at the totality of these contacts to determine that Basis
had availed itself of the Arizona forum.[27]
{10} Similarly, in Rubbercraft Corp. of California v. Rubbercraft, Inc.,[28] the United States District Court
for the Central District of California took a totality of contacts approach. After explaining that a passive
website alone is insufficient to convey jurisdiction in the forum, the court proceeded to evaluate other non-
Internet contacts to determine whether jurisdiction should lie.[29] The court identified Rubbercraft's contacts
as advertisement by webpage and a nationally-circulated periodical, maintenance of an "800 number phone
line," operation of a webpage and sales in the forum of about $20,000 in 1997.[30] The court employed a
totality approach explaining that, "[a]lthough each of these factors may not alone create purposeful availment
[and the other elements required for jurisdiction], in combination they satisfy the ... test of affirmative
conduct ..." sufficiently to establish specific jurisdiction.[31]) In Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.,[32] the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit took a nearly identical approach, in that it found that a
passive website was insufficient to establish jurisdiction, and subsequently employed a totality of contacts
analysis.[33]
2. Effects Test Approach
{11} Another popular approach taken by courts to analyze online jurisdiction is to employ an effects test.
This approach essentially inquires whether the "forum state 'is the focal point of the [defamatory] story and
the harm suffered.'"[34] The inquiry requires an examination of whether the defaming party had the intent to
cause injury in the forum or whether knowledge could be reasonably presumed that injury would be caused in
the forum.
{12} The court employed this effects test in the EDIAS case.[35] In this case, the plaintiff argued for the
exercise of jurisdiction through an effects test analysis, contending that the defendants, through their Internet
actions, knew or should have known that the statements made would create a harm in the forum.[36] The
court agreed with this approach and found that, "[b]asis directed the e-mail, [w]eb[]page and forum message
at Arizona because Arizona is EDIAS' principle place of business. EDIAS allegedly felt the economic effects
of the defamatory statements in Arizona."[37] The court, relying upon California Software, Inc. v. Reliability
Research,[38] explained that, just because the defendant did not send a tangible object into the forum or was
not present in the forum, does not mean that it should be able to use the unique characteristics of Internet
technology to avoid jurisdiction.[39] Therefore, the court found the effects test to be an appropriate rule for
determining jurisdiction over the defendant.
3. Keeton Test Approach
{13} The Keeton test approach to jurisdiction transports a traditional multi-state defamation jurisdictional
analysis into Cyber-Libel. This approach expands on the Single Publication Rule of defamation and allows
for the exercise of jurisdiction where the defamatory statement is published and delivered to the forum.[40]
The Supreme Court explained that the defendant's "regular circulation of magazines in the forum State is
sufficient to support an assertion of jurisdiction in a libel action based on the contents of the magazine
[circulated in the forum]."[41] The Court went on to explain that "regular monthly sales of thousands of
magazines cannot by any stretch of the imagination be characterized as random, isolated, or fortuitous," and
that "[t]he tort of libel is generally held to occur wherever the offending material is circulated."[42] This
would hold true even if the defamed party were essentially anonymous in the forum prior to publication.[43]
Thus, the circulation of even a single copy of the defamatory statement in a forum would give rise to a tort
action, and is sufficient contact for the exercise of jurisdiction.
{14} Applying this approach to jurisdiction in Cyber-Libel provides a unique quandary because the defendant
is likely to argue that he made no purposeful entrance into the state where a generally available website was
accessed in the forum state. The defendant would probably argue that he did not have intention to "circulate"
or "deliver" the statement into the forum. At least one court, however, has employed a Keeton-type approach
to the posting of a defamatory statement by a non-resident defendant on a passive website.
{15} In TELCO Communications v. An Apple A Day,[44] the court addressed whether a defamatory statement
on a passive website is circulation, delivery, and advertisement within the forum state. The court adopted the
Keeton approach and found that, even though the evidence showed that the defendant had no other actual
contacts with the forum, An Apple A Day was subject to the exercise of jurisdiction.[45] The court explained
that defamation occurs wherever the material is "distributed," and that the defendant "should reasonably have
known that the press releases would be received in Virginia."[46] Thus, while the defendant took no assertive
action to ensure that the defamatory statement would be received in the forum, the knowledge that the
statement would be circulated and delivered to the forum is sufficient to establish jurisdiction under the
Keeton model. [47]
C. Suggested Approach: Nature of the Website, Zippo Test
{16} Jurisdictional questions in a unique media such as the Internet, require a moderately unique approach.
Blindly applying traditional contacts analysis models to a media which does not typically leave physical
evidence or record of the contacts made, presents difficulties in determining a defendant's amenability to suit
in a particular forum.[48] Because such an approach often proves ineffective, a more reasonable procedure to
determine jurisdiction in Cyber-Libel cases would identify the nature of the electronic communication, and
imply the level of contact that this communication has with a particular forum. Since, under traditional
defamation law, mere delivery of the defamatory statement to a particular forum would establish amenability
to suit, this approach serves to fairly approximate the conventional burden on the defendant.[49] Following a
treatment of jurisdiction that most closely approximates traditional principles in defamation law is most likely
to provide a consistent and dependable result. This nature of the website approach is embodied in Zippo
Manufacturing Company v. Zippo Dot Com.[50]
{17} The court in Zippo established a sliding scale approach to the determination of jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant based on Internet contacts. The court explained:
[T]he likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly
proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the
Internet. This sliding scale is consistent with well developed personal jurisdiction principles. At
one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly does business over the Internet.
If the defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the
knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is
proper. At the opposite end are situations where a defendant has simply posted information on an
Internet Web site which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. A passive Web site that
does little more than make information available to those who are interested in it is not grounds
for the exercise [of] personal jurisdiction. The middle ground is occupied by interactive Web
sites where a user can exchange information with the host computer. In these cases, the exercise
of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity . . . that occurs on the Web
site.[51]
{18} This model for the exercise of personal jurisdiction provides protection from the unreasonable exercise
of jurisdiction, while not wholly foreclosing suit against the libelant, even where the libelant merely "posts"
the defamation to a passive website. [52] While it is true that when posting to a passive website, a defendant
can reasonably assume that his words will be read in any number of jurisdictions, there are no reciprocal
contacts with any forum in which he is not a resident.[53] The sliding scale, however, provides protection
where the defendant specifically sends the defamatory material into a forum, such as with e-mail messages,
[54] and protects where the website is produced by a traditional information source.[55]
{19} One area of controversy under the Zippo approach is the clarification of whether a passive website is
sufficient to convey jurisdiction in a forum over a non-resident. While Zippo explicitly rejects passive
websites as a basis for jurisdiction,[56] TELCO proceeded to analyze the passive website and exercise
jurisdiction since it was, "advertising and soliciting over the Internet, which could be accessed by a Virginia
resident [twenty-four] hours a day . . . [which] constitutes a persistent course of conduct ..."[57] This
approach should be rejected under the suggested model, as it introduces liability for exposure to any
individual or corporate entity in any forum which posts advertisements or information on the Internet. Such
wide-ranging forum jurisdiction is manifestly a violation of the requirement that the exercise of jurisdiction
be reasonable.[58] Furthermore, this approach subjects an individual or small company to jurisdictional
liability in states and locations never imagined as a location of potential customers. The burden on the
individual would thus be truly unreasonable.
 
III. CHOICE OF LAW[59]
{20} While the necessity for a uniform jurisdictional approach has been widely discussed,[60] a uniform
approach to conflict of law issues in Cyber-Libel can prove to be just as important.[61] Unfortunately, the
important issue of choice of law relating to Cyber-Libel has received little attention. The determination of
which state law applies can determine such central issues as, what constitutes defamation, what level of proof
is required, and what is the maximum amount of recovery?[62] While defamation law has its outer
boundaries largely defined by principles of constitutional law, the variations in the state interpretation of
defamation common law principles can be extensive. Just noting the variation in retraction statute protection,
provides ample argument for the varying effect of a choice of law.[63] These differentiations in law are
dramatic in the minds of the litigants, and therefore, are worthy of a separate analysis.
A. General Background In Defamation Cases[64]
1. General Tort Approach
{21} Choice of law questions in tort cases are generally controlled by section 145 of the Restatement on
Conflicts.[65] This section requires an analysis of contacts with the interested states to determine which
state's laws to apply. The inquiry is then guided by the general concepts of conflicts of law established in
section 6 of the Restatement.[66] Section 145 of the Restatement makes the following inquiry: "(a) the place
where injury occurred[;] (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred[;] (c) the domicil, [sic]
residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties[;] and (d) the place where
the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered."[67] In this analysis, the court identifies the potential
states whose laws may be applied.
{22} After determining which states have an interest in the application of its substantive law, the court
applies the general principles of conflicts of law as identified in the Restatement's Section 6 to determine
which of these states' laws are to be applied.[68] Section 6 of the Restatement directs an inquiry focusing on
the following factors: which state has the greatest interest "in having its law applied[,] the relevant policies of
the forum[,] certainty[,] [and] predictability [in the results reached by the state laws,] ease in the . . .
application of the law to be applied[,] the promotion of interstate order[,] . . ." and the policy considerations
underlying the substantive law to be applied.[69] These various factors are weighed to determine which
substantive law should be applied.[70]
2. Traditional Multi-State Defamation Approach
{23} Section 150 of the Restatement on Conflicts of Law controls choice of law questions for the traditional
defamation case. [71] The section applies to cases where the defamatory statement is contained "in any one
edition of a book or newspaper, or any one broadcast over radio or television, exhibition of a motion picture,
or similar aggregate communication ...."[72] The Restatement directs that the law of the state with the "most
significant relationship" to the conduct giving rise to the cause of action be applied.[73] This determination
is, like Restatement section 145,[74] guided by the principles established under section 6 of the Restatement.
[75]
{24} The Restatement section 6 analysis is, however, supplemented by subsections (2) and (3) of section 150.
Subsection (2) explains, "[w]hen a natural person claims that he [or she] has been defamed by an aggregate
communication, the state of most significant relationship will usually be the state where the person was
domiciled at the time, if the matter complained of was published in that state."[76] Similarly, subsection (3)
provides for essentially the same domicile focus for corporate entities.[77] These subsections have, in many
cases, the effect of eliminating the traditional Restatement section 6 analysis in favor of merely determining
the domicile of the defamed party.[78] If, however, the plaintiff's reputation were not harmed in his state of
domicile, the court would employ the Restatement Section 6 test.[79]
B. Suggested Approach: Focus On Domicile and Location of Greatest Effects
{25} While the traditional Multi-State Defamation approach may prove effective in handling conflicts of law
issues, a more reasoned approach may be achieved. A more simplistic approach will ease the judicial burden
of analyzing the complex contacts developed in Cyber-Libel. With the uncertainty created in anonymous
Internet communications, and the complexity in developing a record of forum contacts,[80] a more direct
approach may be needed. To be successful in easing judicial burden, this method must avoid making a
contact-by-contact analysis of interested fora. The central goal in reaching a well-founded principle is to
avoid over-complication, while reaching a reasoned legal approach.
{26} To achieve this goal, the most obvious and judicially sound point from which to begin is the domicile of
the defamed party. In taking this tack, it is important to note that the analysis of Restatement Section 150 is
an important guidepost.[81] The Wilson court explained, "[t]he state of a plaintiff's domicile is generally the
place where most of his reputational contacts are found; therefore, 'the state of plaintiff's domicile generally
has the greatest concern in vindicating plaintiff's good name ...' "[82] Thus, domicile should provide a
generally accurate starting point for determining which state's law should apply.
{27} While it is true that the domicile state is most likely to be the most interested state in many defamation
actions, situations will occur where the greatest effect of the defamatory statement is not felt in the plaintiff's
domicile.[83] This problem can occur with frequency in the case of a corporate plaintiff because a corporate
plaintiff may be a registered corporation in one state, yet conduct the vast majority of its business outside of
that state.[84] Thus, for example, a film company formed as a Delaware corporation may suffer the greatest
harm from defamation in California, where its potential employees reside. Such defamation and the resulting
harms to the film company's reputation and goodwill may cause difficulty in obtaining big name actors and a
proper technical crew. The same irrationality of choosing, de facto, the state of domicile in all cases may also
arise in the case of an individual plaintiff.[85] It is for these very reasons that a secondary test must be
developed.
{28} This secondary test should focus on the location where the greatest injury is caused by the defamatory
statement. It is in this state that the plaintiff, who otherwise enjoys a positive reputation, loses the most value.
The state has an interest in encouraging the maintenance of a positive reputation, as the individual or
corporate entity will presumptively have a positive effect on some aspect of that forum. In order to determine
the state where the greatest injury is incurred, an effects test seems well-suited and appropriately constructed
to make an accurate determination. This test is a modification of the jurisdictional effects test, as applied by
the court in EDIAS.[86]
{29} The central inquiry in the application of this secondary effects test is not whether the defendant knew
that his actions would have an effect in the particular forum,[87] but instead, focuses upon the location of the
greatest demonstrable impact of the defamatory statement. This impact can be shown through purposeful
direction of the defendant's defamatory statement,[88] through actual shown economic harm, or through other
relevant substantive and opinion evidence. The court then evaluates the evidence presented and makes a
determination as to the state where the greatest impact is felt. It is important to note that this secondary
effects test should only be employed when affirmatively plead by one of the parties, and should not be a sua
sponte determination by the court. By placing this restriction on the secondary test, simplicity is encouraged,
and the morass that choice of law determinations can occasionally produce is avoided.
IV. ONLINE DEFAMATION, SUBSTANTIVE LAW
A. General Background[89]
{30} Substantive law in the area of defamation is well defined. The following discussion is a basic review of
the general principles of defamation as developed through common law principles. Much of what follows are
the constitutional principles that set the outer limits of defamation liability as defined under First Amendment
principles by federal courts. It is important to note that, while principles of constitutional defamation law
seem well-grounded, to some extent, they are still new and experimental. In a greater scheme, constitutional
defamation law is no more than a generation old[90] and is always subject to slow modification.
{31} Defamation is the "intentional false communication, either published or publically spoken, that injures
another's reputation or good name."[91] In order to receive recovery in a defamation suit, the defamed party
must first show that the defamatory statement was one of purported fact about the plaintiff.[92] To meet this
burden, the plaintiff must demonstrate that a reasonable reader or recipient of the defamatory material would
understand that the statement was in reference to the plaintiff. [93] The defamed party must then show that
the defamatory statement was not subject to privilege,[94] and was "published" and "delivered" to a third
party.[95] The plaintiff is then required to show that the defamatory statement caused some harm upon which
recovery may be made.[96]
{32} The plaintiff's burden of proof is determined by assessing under which judicially established category of
defamation suit his cause of action falls. These categories are established based upon the relative notoriety of
the plaintiff. If the plaintiff is a pervasive public figure,[97] and the statement made is about a subject related
to his fame, then the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with actual malice.[98] Similarly, a public
official criticized for his actions in the scope of his official duties must also prove actual malice by clear and
convincing evidence on the part of the defendant.[99] If the plaintiff is a private citizen and the defamatory
statement relates to a private concern, the plaintiff's burden is minimal because the statement is presumed
false, and the defendant must demonstrate that the statement made was substantially true.[100] Finally, if the
plaintiff is a private figure defamed about a subject of public concern, the defendant is subject to liability if
the defendant knew the information to be false or acted in reckless disregard for the truth.[101]
{33} Additionally, the classification of the defendant will also affect the burdens established in a defamation
case. A defendant may be either a publisher, distributor, or a common carrier.[102] A common carrier - an
entity that has no editorial control over the information it carries - such as a telephone company, may not be
held liable for information that it merely transmits from one party to another as a passive conduit.[103] A
publisher, such as a newspaper or other entity that retains editorial control over the information it sends out,
is held accountable if the traditional burdens discussed above are met, and at least negligence is shown in its
actions.[104] A distributor, on the other hand, is often compared to a public library, and as such, may only be
held liable upon a plaintiff's prima facie case and the showing that the distributor had actual knowledge of the
defamatory content or should have reasonably known of the defamatory nature of the work.[105] Thus, a
synthesis of the categorization of plaintiff and defendant reveals that, in a general sense, traditional
defamation law imputes liability based upon the nature of the party defamed and the editorial control retained
by the particular defendant.
B. Historical Cyber-Libel Development
{34} Cyber-Libel is an outgrowth of traditional defamation principles. As courts have struggled to adapt
traditional print media applications to the electronic world, a number of legal fictions have been established
and then eliminated. Judicial development has been supplemented with halting and stunted legislation. An
effective approach must synthesize the positive attributes that have been historically developed with a
forward-looking view of potential future issues. Additionally, any new suggested approach must address the
limiting nature of congressional legislation, which has served as a positive influence, while at the same time,
undercutting protections that lie at the heart of defamation law protections.
1. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc.
{35} In an early Cyber-Libel decision, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
employed a publisher/distributor analysis to determine if an Internet service provider would be held liable for
information available in its "electronic library."[106] CompuServe, as part of the package of services it
offered its subscribers, maintained a general information service known as CompuServe Information Service
("CIS"). CIS included a variety of fora which provided an interactive platform for the discussion of over 150
topic areas. One of these topic areas was a journalism forum, which included a daily newsletter devoted to
discussion of journalist activities and broadcast journalism, known as "Rumorville." Rumorville was
published by Don Fitzpatrick Associates and was made available to CompuServe through a contract for
service.[107] Additionally, the journalism forum was handled by a third party, Cameron Communications,
Inc. Cameron, by contract with CompuServe, was required to, "'manage, review, create, delete, edit and
otherwise control the contents' of the [j]ournalism [f]orum 'in accordance with editorial and technical
standards and conventions of style as established by CompuServe.' "[108] CompuServe contractually
disclaimed all rights to directly edit Rumorville.
{36} Cubby, Inc. also developed a computer database program called "Skuttlebut," which was dedicated to
the discussion of news and gossip about broadcast journalists. Cubby asserted that Rumorville published
defamatory comments about Skuttlebut. The comments stated that Skuttlebut's authors received their
information in an unethical manner and described the forum as a " 'new startup scam.' "[109] Cubby filed suit
against CompuServe and the individual author of Rumorville, essentially claiming a defamation cause of
action.[110]
{37} The court, in response to a motion for summary judgment made by CompuServe, found that the service
provider was only a distributor, who maintained no editorial control and thus dismissed CompuServe as a
defendant.[111] The court explained that CompuServe, as a mere passive conduit, without direct editorial
control, could not be held liable. The court found that, in spite of CompuServe's contractual relationship with
Cameron and Rumorville, and in spite of the promulgation of guidelines by CompuServe for the proper
management of its fora, CompuServe maintained no editorial control and had no knowledge or reason to have
knowledge of the defamatory content.[112] The court analogized the information service to the maintenance
of a for-profit library, thus establishing a high burden for the plaintiff.[113]
{38} In granting summary judgment, the effect of the court's decision was to establish a three-prong test. The
court first determined if CompuServe was a publisher or distributor. This inquiry asked whether there was
editorial control, or alternatively, if CompuServe was similar to a library or bookstore (i.e., a distributor of
information).[114] The court, finding CompuServe to be a distributor, next determined if the defendant could
be held liable as a distributor. To do so, the court required that once CompuServe had shown that it did not
have actual knowledge of the defamatory material, the plaintiff must make an affirmative showing that the
defendant either did know, or should have known, the defamatory nature of the statement. [115] Finally, the
court inquired whether or not CompuServe could be held vicariously liable for the defamatory comments due
to its contractual relationship with Cameron and Rumorville. The court rejected vicarious liability as a means
of recovery, requiring that there be some showing of actual direction and control by CompuServe.[116]
2. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.[117]
{39} In a case strikingly similar to Cubby, the Supreme Court of New York held Prodigy, an Internet service
provider, liable for statements made on an Internet bulletin board maintained for its customers.[118] In this
case, a defamatory statement was posted to Prodigy's "money talk" bulletin board, claiming that Stratton
Oakmont and its president, Daniel Porush, "committed criminal and fraudulent acts in connection with an
initial public offering of stock," and other related claims of criminal activity. [119] Stratton Oakmont and
Daniel Porush filed an action for libel along with nine other causes of action, and sought partial summary
judgment against Prodigy.[120] The court was asked to determine, inter alia, "whether Prodigy may be
considered a 'publisher' of the [defamatory] statements[,] and, whether Epstein, the [contracted] Board Leader
for the computer bulletin board on which the statements were posted [by an unknown party], acted with
actual and apparent authority as Prodigy's 'agent' for the purposes of the claims in this action."[121]
{40} The facts of the case revealed that Prodigy advertized itself as a "family oriented computer network,"
that "held itself out as a[n] online service that exercised editorial control," and "expressly liken[ed] itself to a
newspaper."[122] Furthermore, Prodigy promulgated extensive guidelines describing what would be
appropriate in postings and when a posting would be removed by its board leaders.[123] Prodigy also
employed a screening program, which automatically screened content for "offensive material," and they
employed board leaders to enforce its guidelines.[124] Though Prodigy claimed to have changed its policy on
the automatic content review of postings, the court found no substantial evidence of such a change, and
therefore, held Prodigy accountable to these prior statements of policy.[125]
{41} The court in Stratton also begins its analysis of the dispute by inquiring whether or not Prodigy may be
considered a publisher or distributor of the defamatory material.[126] The Stratton court distinguishes Cubby
and finds for the plaintiffs. [127] The court based its holding on two primary findings: first, that Prodigy held
itself out to have content control, and second, that such control was actually performed through the use of an
automatic software screening program and the "[g]uidelines which Board Leaders are required to enforce."
[128] It determined that these practices constituted editorial control and thus, made Prodigy a publisher
instead of a distributor. Further, the court found that the Board Leaders were agents of Prodigy because they
were given direct guidelines which must be followed and given no authority to create policy.[129]
{42} The Stratton court, like in Cubby, again follows a three-step review. First, the court determines whether
Prodigy is a publisher or a distributor. It explains that one who republishes a defamatory statement has the
same liability as the original author.[130] The Stratton court finds editorial control through the power of
Board Leaders to publish or remove postings. [131] The court next establishes a unique manner to determine
why Prodigy is a publisher, by focusing on its public statements of editorial control, the use of automated
computer software, and contracting for "editorial" decisions through its Board Leaders.[132] Finally, it also
employs a form of vicarious agent liability rejected by the Cubby court.[133] The court, therefore, while
claiming to be in harmony with the decision in Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc.,[134] provides an apparently
conflicting analysis to online service provider liability.
3. Communications Decency Act of 1996 § 230(c)[135]
{43} Shortly after the Stratton decision, Congress established a strong service provider protection from
online defamation in the Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA").[136] Subsection (c)(1) of this
section provides, "[n]o provider or user of any interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher
or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider."[137] This mandate, in
combination with subsection (2) of the same section,[138] provides a complete shield from a defamation suit
for an online service provider, absent an affirmative showing that the service was the actual author of the
defamatory content. Legislative intent shows that the section was passed as a specific response to the finding
of liability in the Stratton case.[139]
C. Current Approach
1. Zeran v. America Online, Inc.[140]
{44} After the enactment of the CDA, the judicial approach to defamation cases changed significantly. In
Zeran, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals gave significant force to the protections established in Section 230
of the CDA. The court found that this new statutory provision prohibited Zeran's action against America
Online ("AOL"). [141]
{45} Kenneth Zeran brought an action against AOL for unreasonable delay in removing defamatory
messages posted by a third party and for refusing to post a retraction.[142] The action was precipitated by a
posting to an AOL bulletin board on April 25, 1995, by an unidentified party who advertized that the plaintiff
was selling T-shirts making jest of the Oklahoma City Federal Building bombing.[143] The posting directed
people to contact the plaintiff at his home phone number in Seattle, Washington to purchase the t-shirts. As a
result of this posting and subsequent similar postings, Zeran received "a high volume of calls, comprised
primarily of angry and derogatory messages, but also including death threats."[144] Zeran contacted AOL to
have the messages removed, a retraction posted, and the account closed from which the postings were being
made. The parties disputed how long the delay was in removing the defamatory postings, but the evidence is
clear that AOL refused to post a retraction.[145] Subsequently, an Oklahoma City radio station broadcast the
contents of the posting.[146] AOL filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was granted in its
favor and upheld upon appeal.[147]
{46} The Fourth Circuit rejected Zeran's argument that AOL should be held liable for failing, upon being
given notice, to remove the defamatory material, to notify its customers that the statements were false, and to
screen for future similarly false statements. The court stated that, "[b]y its plain language, § 230 [of the CDA]
creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information
originating with a third-party user of the service."[148] Thus, the court held that failure to exercise editorial
control was not a basis for recovery after the passage of CDA § 230(c).[149] The court later rejected Zeran's
claim that the provisions of CDA § 230(c) only protected publishers, but not distributors. The court explained
that a distributor was just a sub-class of the legal classification "publisher," and therefore, would be covered
under the liability protections of CDA § 230(c).[150] The court justified its broad interpretation of
"publisher" by explaining, "'[t]he rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly
construed does not require such an adherence to the letter as would defeat an obvious legislative purpose or
lessen the scope plainly intended to be given to the measure.'"[151] Finally, the court rejects liability based
upon notice and limits Zeran's potential recovery to a suit against the original author of the posting.[152]
{47} The court makes four essential holdings in the Zeran case. First, the court notes that CDA § 230(c) bars
Internet service provider liability for acting as either a publisher or distributor of defamatory statements.[153]
The court then finds that this total protection for service providers was the explicit intent of Congress, who
was seeking to overturn the rule established in Stratton.[154] Additionally, the court established, as a matter
of law, that notice to an Internet service provider of defamatory content in the information it provides does
not create liability.[155] Finally, the court recognizes that, in situations similar to Zeran's, the only party
which may be held liable is the original author of the defamatory statement.[156]
2. Blumenthal v. Drudge[157]
{48} In this recent interpretation of the limits of protection afforded by CDA § 230(c), the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia barred recovery for a plaintiff relating to defamatory statements,
where the Internet service provider acted in an editorial role prior to posting of the statement.[158] The court
recognized this vast protection while noting that under traditional defamation law, AOL, the service provider
who "published" the defamatory statements, would have been held accountable.[159] Further, the court, as in
Cubby and through the effect of CDA § 230, rejected the notion that contractually provided content would
give rise to Internet service provider liability.[160]
{49} Matt Drudge was the author of an electronic publication known as the Drudge Report, which focused on
gossip relating to the entertainment industry and governmental officials. Drudge disseminated his publication
by e-mail, his personal World Wide Web site, and through AOL, with whom he had a contract to provide his
information. [161] Drudge received a flat monthly fee of three thousand dollars from AOL for providing his
publication to disseminate to AOL customers. [162] AOL did, however, reserve the right to modify the
content of the report to meet AOL's standards. [163] The August 10, 1997 edition of the Drudge Report
contained allegedly defamatory statements regarding Sidney and Jacqueline Blumenthal. The statements
claimed that Sidney Blumenthal had a history of domestic violence against his wife. [164] Both Blumenthals
were employees of the United States Government in Washington D.C., and were associated with the Office of
the President. After publishing his report, Drudge immediately received a letter from the Blumenthals'
attorney, which caused him to post a retraction on August 12, 1997.[165] The Blumenthals filed suit against
both Drudge and AOL. The court held that, pursuant to CDA § 230, AOL was entitled to summary judgment.
{50} The Blumenthal court made several key findings and established a number of broad-ranging
implications to CDA § 230, in protecting AOL from liability. The court found that, although Drudge was a
contract employee of AOL, this fact did not provide liability unless a direct employee of AOL was the author
of the defamatory statement.[166] Though the court acknowledged that, under traditional defamation law,
AOL could be held liable as either a "publisher" or "distributor," even its retention of editorial control did not
give rise to liability in the face of CDA § 230(c).[167] The court again makes the observation that the only
potentially liable party is the original author, Matt Drudge.[168]
D. Suggested Approach: Original Author Liability, Substantive Editor - Service Provider Liability
{51} In defining the protections afforded by the CDA, the courts have nearly foreclosed the possibility of
recovery for Cyber-Libel. Such an approach creates a special area of unique protection that can serve to
encourage wild speculation without fear of liability. While Congress had laudable goals in attempting to
encourage self-regulation of the Internet,[169] the protection provided has eliminated the possibility of
substantial recovery, even where an Internet service provider retains editorial control over the defamatory
content.[170] This Cyber-Libel scheme eviscerates the protections and disincentives to information sources in
ensuring that false statements are not disseminated. The court is short-sighted in completely foreclosing
recovery against Internet "publishers," as it ignores the dual interests of states in protecting the reputation of
its domicilliaries and protecting its citizens from the dissemination of false information.[171]
{52} A more reasoned approach would find a more balanced treatment of the desired protection for Internet
service providers and the traditional reputation protection of defamation law. It would provide substantive
protection for online information distributors, while not shielding the same companies from gross displays of
indifference, or even participation in the making of defamatory statements. The ideal approach would
maintain the CDA §230(c)'s desired encouragement of self-regulation [172] without foreclosing recovery to
plaintiffs who are grievously harmed by false statements.
{53} One logical approach would begin with the one constant between traditional defamation law and Cyber-
Libel, as it has developed. This constant is the continued liability of the original author of the defamatory
statement. [173] This would ensure in a large number of cases that at least some means of satisfaction, even if
limited, is achieved. [174]
{54} An additional source of recovery should also be established in a limited number of circumstances. This
recovery should be afforded where the Internet service provider has served as an active editor of the
defamatory statement that it published. More precisely, the service provider should be held accountable
where it takes the role of actively editing, either by adding additional text or by editing for length and
content. Essentially, by this provision, content provided by a third party, but edited by the service provider,
such as in an online magazine, is treated in the same fashion as traditional print media. The service provider
is not to be subject to liability as a passive conduit, [175] or for automated software screening for
objectionable material. [176] Additionally, where the control exercised by the service provider consisted of
merely deciding whether to publish or to remove information, the provider is protected in accordance with
CDA § 230(c). [177] Thus, the stated desire of Congress to overturn the rule in Stratton is preserved, while
allowing for full recovery by a plaintiff, where the service provider actively participated in the defamation.
{55} This second source of recovery is not in conflict with the language of CDA § 230(c). Under § 230(c)(1),
an Internet service provider who actively participates in the editing or writing of a defamatory statement is
not merely a recipient of "information provided by another information content provider." [178] The service
provider is, instead, deemed a co-author of the defamatory content, and therefore, would not be in the class of
entities protected by the CDA. Furthermore, if the service provider engaged in active editing or substantive
additions to the defamatory statement, it would no longer be acting in "good faith." [179] Recovery in such a
scenario would, therefore, not be in direct violation with the statutory language passed by Congress.
{56} A more equitable median can be struck. Defamation law seeks to redress what is often a very painful, if
not externally obvious, injury. The near preclusion of recovery under current interpretive maxims seems to
overlook the very foundational precepts underlying defamation. It is as if neither the judicial nor legislative
branch places value in a person's honor or reputation. This small adjustment in interpretation suggested above
restores some measure of protection.
V. RETRACTION STATUTE APPLICABILITY
{57} Any truly comprehensive treatment of defamation law must address one last area of concern - retraction
statutes. These statutes provide either a partial or complete defense to the defamation action, depending upon
the jurisdiction involved. [180] As a means of protecting the publisher in a print world, requiring a fair
rebuttal and retraction of the defamatory content previously published can be a means of providing - in some
manner - a restoration of the injured party's reputation. In this sense, the retraction not only serves the interest
of truth, but defends the previously tattered honor of an individual. This makes the retraction potentially the
most effective means of remedying injury at the earliest possible moment. One need look no further than the
local newspaper to see, almost daily, the exercise of this very principle. [181]
{58} Though the retraction in a traditional print media can be very effective, it is not necessarily as effective
in the online world. While many web-surfers do reach the same page daily, [182] many recreational Internet
users may cross a page only once. Thus, the applicability of the retraction may be legitimately questioned.
However, when a particularly offensive statement or communication is carried on a webpage, a strong
retraction can often prove to quell the damage done. [183] Thus, the web-surfer who is more than just a
casual passerby to the particular website will be informed. It is with this notion of at least partial
effectiveness, and the fact that at a minimum, thirty-three states have retraction statutes, [184] that the issue
must be addressed.
A. Common Law
{59} At common law, retraction was a factual basis by which the publisher could mitigate damages resulting
from a defamatory statement.[185] Mere retraction was generally insufficient to avoid liability on the part of
the publisher, but was seen as a form of good faith attempt by the publisher to lessen the effect of the libelous
material. Retraction under common law was also given the vague limitation of requiring that it must be
sufficient in light of what a reasonable person would understand as satisfactory, given the surrounding
circumstances.[186] The level of mitigation that the retraction caused would be determined by the fact-finder
upon deciding that sufficiency had been achieved.[187] The lack of a retraction could be viewed as evidence
of malice in determining whether or not punitive damages could be awarded. Thus, while a publisher is under
no affirmative duty to publish a retraction, such retraction can be used to avoid punitive damages and to ease
the general damage burden.
B. Current Approach/Statutory
{60} As previously noted, the majority of jurisdictions have codified some form of the common law
retraction defense. Seemingly endless machinations have been employed to create mildly varying schemes in
relation to retraction. These sometimes conflicting approaches often "muddy the waters" of establishing a
clear defense, particularly when one is a publisher or broadcaster with a wide distribution or reception. If the
"publisher" of the defamatory statement is even as common as a local television station, application of
retraction statutory mechanisms can be difficult. One such problematic example can be extrapolated from a
hypothetical event in our nation's capital. If, for example, a Washington D.C. network affiliate broadcasts
false rumors about a local entertainer of little note, it is possible that the station, in seeking to employ
retraction principles, may be faced with as many as five different rules. [188] In light of this potential
confusion relating to traditional media sources, it is easy to imagine the near impossibility of predicting the
necessary requirements for retraction in a Cyber-Libel case. A beginning point involves the need to identify
the primary areas of differentiation.
{61} Differentiation can arise in no less than five major areas. First, divergence can be found in the damages
recoverable after a successful retraction. Damages may be limited to actual damages, [189] or mitigated by
the retraction, [190] while others may only preclude punitive damages upon a retraction. [191] Variation can
be found in whether the jurisdiction requires a retraction demand on the part of the plaintiff and the effect of
this demand. [192] A good number of states require that the retraction be made within a specific time period,
[193] while others provide exacting requirements of form and location for the retraction. [194]
{62} This mishmash of variety only serves to guarantee confusion for a potentially liable party. A more
uniform and flexible standard needs to be developed in order to provide a modicum of clarity and to protect
the Internet service provider or publisher. While many are loathe - and with good reason - to encourage
further federal legislation in the Cyber-Libel area of law, retraction may be the one area where legislation
could be beneficial.
{63} First and foremost, any legislation must establish a reasonable but adaptable standard for determining
when a sufficient retraction has occurred. This principle in seeking fairness can, and should, use a tool as
simple as human wisdom. One possible touchstone is that standard established by California of "substantially
conspicuous." [195] Put simply, if the retraction is done in a manner that is open, noticeable, and not of
unnecessary variance in visual importance on the particular website, it should be considered sufficient. [196]
In the interest of providing real protection for the "publisher," while not eliminating recovery for the potential
plaintiff, it is suggested that the retraction have the effect of partially limiting damages. This balance between
maintaining some right to recovery, and affording protection for the publisher who has simply made an
honest mistake, can be achieved while retaining a level of discretion. A party who makes a sufficient
retraction should not be liable for punitive damages, as they have demonstrated by their retraction that it is
unlikely conventional malice [197] actually exists. Further, as has been previously explained, such retraction
could serve to lessen the impact of the defamatory statement. Accordingly, retraction should be accorded
status as a mitigating factor when determining damages. Lastly, a formal demand for retraction should not be
required. The establishment of a formal demand seems without reasonable foundation. Some notice should be
required; however, it seems to be not unduly burdensome to the plaintiff to require that, at a minimum, he
give notice of the falsity of the defamatory statement to the online publisher.
{64} This formula provides a simple means of applying retraction principles to a modern online world. There
is predictability and convenience, while protecting both parties' interests. The defamed party not only has the
potential impact lessened by receiving the benefits of encouraging retraction, but he is also not forestalled
from all recovery simply because of a footnote at the bottom of a webpage. The Internet publisher receives
protection through the guaranteed avoidance of punitive damages, and is rewarded with mitigation if prompt
and "substantially conspicuous" action is taken. While it may still be left to the jury to decide the end effect
of the retraction's mitigation power, on the whole, it can be expected that swift and appropriate retraction
should significantly reduce liability exposure.
VI. CONCLUSION
{65} Though much has been written about the development of Cyber-Libel law, no unified rational approach
has been developed by the courts to handle the variety of complex issues that arise in this unique area of law.
By providing a direct course for courts to follow in an area of the law which is likely to be confusing for the
average jurist, the Supreme Court provides the greatest of services. The author has humbly presented a course
of action that attacks the primary areas of concern in a Cyber-Libel case - from online jurisdiction - through a
suggested modification of the interpretation of the CDA § 230 - to the applicability of retraction statutes. The
approach takes into consideration the concerns of both plaintiff and defendant, while remaining mindful of
congressional directives. The author suggests that jurisdictional questions in Cyber-Libel cases be controlled
by the Zippo [198] nature of the communications test, an already prevalent approach that provides the
greatest fairness and accuracy. Choice of law in Cyber-Libel is best served by the simplicity of domicilliary
focus, as found in the Restatement section 150, [199] augmented by the availability of a modified effects test,
where a party pleads that domicile is not controlling. [200]
{66} It is suggested that substantive Cyber-Libel law be brought to a reasoned middle ground between the
current bar on service provider recovery and the interest in plaintiff recovery. Any reaffirmation of the
importance of freedom from defamatory attack must include some movement away from the current, rigid,
near bar on recovery. This balancing is best achieved by employing a system of liability that opens service
providers liability for defamatory statements, when the provider has substantively edited the statement, while
not opening liability for minor editing, existence as a mere conduit, or electronic-filtering activities. [201]
Furthermore, the application of retraction statute-like defenses on behalf of the service provider should be
encouraged as a means of early mitigation and reputation protection.
{67} There can be no injury more personal than defamation of character. The pride and self worth of an
individual often go beyond the bounds of mere monetary loss. It is hoped that the scheme provided herein
would serve to protect the sensitive nature of a defamation plaintiff, while still providing significant
protection to information sources. The balance is a difficult one to strike, but some "happy mediun" must be
found.
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